Abstract -Currently, detecting potential threats in air passenger baggage heavily depends on the human examination of X-ray images of individual luggage items. In order to improve the performance of airport security personnel in searching images of air passenger luggage it is important first to understand fully the requirements of the demanding task. Here, an experiment is reported where eye movements of naive observers and screeners were recorded when they searched 30 X-ray images of air passenger luggage for potential terrorist threat items such as guns, knives and improvised explosive devices. Compared with novices, the advantages of the screeners were speed and accuracy in detecting threats. Eye position data revealed that screeners were faster to fixate on target areas and once they fixated on targets their hit rate was significantly higher. Most of the IEDs were missed by both naive observers and screeners due to interpretation errors which indicated the importance of training. Stimulus salience at the first fixation locations of naive observers and screeners was compared to investigate expertise development. It was found that experience did not change attention preference on stimuli properties at the beginning of the observers visual search. The implications and further studies are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
Air passenger luggage inspection within aviation security has become an important topic of how to keep explosives and other potential threats off aircraft. Although the American Transportation Security Administration (TSA) contemplates using computed tomography (CT) technology for screening carry-on bags, the technology for luggage examination has not changed much, as CT is more expensive than current Xray systems, and for other reasons. The detection and recognition of potential threat items heavily depends on human interpretation of X-ray luggage images. The most useful information provided by traditional one-view X-ray technology and expressed on a luggage image is an object's density which loses the texture and the colour of the object, and can make the object's edge and shape indistinct. Unfortunately, from 'shoe-bombs' to the recent UK liquid explosives plot, terrorist threats are both productive and diverse. Screeners work under high levels of noisy and timepressurized environments and search for weak, infrequent and changeable targets in two-dimensional X-ray images; so it is arduous for security screeners to maintain a high level of vigilance and knowledge about how to detect recurrent 'novel' threat targets among cluttered backgrounds. It is a challenging task for human limitations of perceptual and cognitive flexibility [1] . As a consequence, other than designing appropriate threat detection systems, it is essential to understand the requirements and extract task expertise so as to improve screener's capabilities.
In domains of medical images examination, and other realworld search, a two-stage visual search model has been developed which provides knowledge to aid understanding the task of airport security screeners [2] [3] [4] To measure task performance, the mean reaction time for accurate target-present and target-absent decisions was calculated. The analysis showed that screeners made decisions much more quickly than the na7ve observers, t = 2.475, df = 14, p < 0.05 for accurate target-present responses and, t = 3.913, df = 14, p < 0.01 for accurate target-absent responses. Fig. 2 shows that the nafve observers took longer than screeners for all responses. 
B. Visual Search
Eye position data are recorded by the eye tracker as X, Y coordinates corresponding to the horizontal and vertical dimensions of the displayed image being viewed. Original eye position data are fairly meaningless about how observers are viewing an image unless these are grouped into fixations based on certain spatial and temporal thresholds. Observers process visual information when the eyes fixate on specific areas for a long enough time. In this study, a fixation, or a cluster of fixations, was determined by an algorithm using 2.50 visual angle as a spatial measure, which is a typical useful field of view size found in medical image inspection research and also in airport luggage image inspection [15] , and 200 milliseconds as a minimum fixation duration.
Each target area of a threat item was defined as an Area Of Interest (AOI) for understanding how observers detect or miss targets [16] . Then relative variables, such as; eye position data of the time to first enter the AOI, and the dwell time on the AOI, were calculated. In accord with the decision time of screeners and naTve observers, table 1 shows that the time to first enter the AOI, and also the dwell time on the AOI of screeners, were shorter than that of the nafve observers. Moreover, the difference between screeners and naive observers of dwell time on the AOI for the miss responses and the time to first enter the AOI of an IED was significant, t = 3.867, df = 14, p < 0.01 and t = 2.625, df = 14, p < 0.05, respectively. The hit rate on an lED for screeners (12/72) was reliably better than naive observers (31/72) -Pearson Chi-Square analysis, x2 = 11.97, df = 1, p = 0.001. Miss errors were classified into three types based on the useful field of view and gaze duration [17] . In this study, AOI was taken as a reference for the target area so that if observers fixated on the AOI, then targets were scored as hits by the eye fixations. Then if targets are not hit by any fixations, such a miss error is called a search error due to inadequate visual attention. If targets are hit by fixations and the gaze duration is less than 1000 ms, then the miss error is called a recognition error. Furthermore, if targets are fixated for more than 1000 ms, then this is termed an interpretation error. Most of the threat items were missed due to interpretation errors for both the naive observers and the screeners whilst the percentage of interpretation error of the naive observers was higher than that of the screeners (see table 2 ). Although participants fixated on target areas for a longer period and processed the visual information, they still missed the targets due to their lack of knowledge of what constituted such a threat item. Missed IEDs accounted for the main percentage of interpretation errors while most of the knives were missed because of search errors which was one of the possible reasons that the dwell time on knives was the shortest, compared with guns and IEDs.
C. Initial Visual Selective Attention
Performance and eye movement data analysis showed that the screeners' advantages were of speed and accuracy when they searched for threat items in X-ray luggage images. In addition, screeners were faster to fixate on target areas than naive observers, especially for IEDs. Is there any difference in the initial visual attention paid to X-ray luggage images between screeners and naive observers? The salience value of the first fixation point of the screeners and naive observers was extracted from the corresponding saliency map to examine whether there was a difference of at nine spatial scales from 1: 2 (level 0) to 1:28 (level 8) by a Gaussian pyramid scheme. After the linear filtering visual features are processed by centre-surround differences to maximize local differences and increase spatial contrast in each feature channel to obtain a total of 42 feature maps. Then multiple feature maps are normalized which eliminates feature-dependent factors by two-dimensional difference-ofGaussians filter. The program ('saliencytoolbox') adopts the method of "max-normalize" which maximizes the local difference so that the real salience can not be found from the saliency map. For computational convenience a change was performed for normalization such that salience was scaled to range from 0 to 255. After normalization, three conspicuity maps for colour, intensity and orientation are obtained and linearly summed into the unique saliency map.
For each of the 30 X-ray luggage images a visual saliency map was calculated. Then the mean salience at the first fixation location of each participant for all images was found. The salience at the first fixation location of screeners and naive observers was 137 and 140, respectively. The difference was not significant, t (14) < 1. Fig. 3 . Example of an X-ray luggage image (left) and its generated saliency map (right).
IV. DISCUSSION
In this study, the difference between naive observers and screeners on performance, visual scanning and recognition skills was explored when they completed a simulated airport security examination task. As expected, screeners detected and recognized threat items such as guns, knives and IEDs more quickly and accurately than naTve observers. Better detection ability of screeners was shown by significantly higher sensitivity and a slightly lower false alarm rate than naTve observers. Also, the visual search of screeners was more effective with a shorter time to fixate on target areas than naive observers, especially for IEDs. It is impossible for observers to learn about IED appearances in everyday life so screeners benefitted from training and experience in recognising IEDs. However, the hit rate on IEDs of the screeners was not high in this study. Analysis of the reason for errors showed that most of the IEDs were missed due to interpretation errors where participants fixated on target areas for a long time but they still missed them. This indicated that as the form of IED is very changeable so that it is necessary for screeners to update their knowledge of such threat item appearances. Search errors were the main miss error for knives in this study. One possible reason was that these targets are relatively small within a cluttered luggage background. Generally, screeners detect knives with the assistance of the displayed image using colour to indicate a metal present in the luggage item, e.g. inorganic materials are marked by blue. If knives are made with any low-density materials such as wood, glass or epoxy fibre, then it is possible for an observer to ignore them -regular and appropriate training is a solution for this problem.
It was interesting that participants detected some targets even when they did not fixate on them. Although the hit rate following no fixation on a target was very low for naive observers VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
